Recent Developments: Young v. State: Supreme Court\u27s Holding in Apprendi Does Not Apply to Sex Offender Registry by Kefalas, Chrys P.
University of Baltimore Law Forum
Volume 33
Number 1 Summer/Fall 2002 Article 19
2002
Recent Developments: Young v. State: Supreme
Court's Holding in Apprendi Does Not Apply to
Sex Offender Registry
Chrys P. Kefalas
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Baltimore Law Forum by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information, please
contact snolan@ubalt.edu.
Recommended Citation
Kefalas, Chrys P. (2002) "Recent Developments: Young v. State: Supreme Court's Holding in Apprendi Does Not Apply to Sex




Young v. State: 
Supreme Court's Holding In Apprendi Does Not Apply to Sex Offender Registry 
I n a case of first impression, the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland held the Supreme Court's 
holding in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 
530 U.S. 466 (2000), does not 
apply to sex offender registry. 
Youngv. State, 370 Md. 686, 690, 
806 A.2d 233, 235 (2002). In so 
holding, the court determined 
Maryland's Registration of Offend-
ers statute, which requires certain 
convicted defendants to register as 
sex offenders, is not punishment, 
and does not violate due process 
rights enunciated in Apprendi. Id. 
at 716, 806 A.2d at 250. 
In the summer of 1999, 
Jessica McGregor ("McGregor"), a 
sixteen-year-old girl, met Jessie Lee 
Young ("Young"), a thirty-four-year-
old man who ran an escort service 
in New York. Young, with know-
ledge that McGregor was a minor, 
allowed her to join his escort service 
as a prostitute. During the first week 
of September 1999, Young and 
McGregor moved to metropolitan 
Washington D.C., where McGregor 
continued to work as a prostitute. 
Young was convicted in the 
Circuit Court for Anne Arundel 
County for transporting a person 
for the purposes of prostitution in 
violation of Md. Code Art. 27, 
section 432 (1996 & Supp. 2000). 
The statutory maximum sentence 
was ten years. The circuit court 
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sentenced Young to ten years, with 
credit for time served, and all but 
eight years suspended. Additionally, 
the court placed Young on five years 
probation and ordered, pursuant to 
Md. Code Art. 27, section 792 
(1996 & Supp. 2000) that he 
register as a sexual offender. 
Young appealed to the Court 
of Special Appeals of Maryland, 
challenging the registration re-
quirement. The court of special 
appeals affirmed. Young filed a 
petition for a writ of certiorari, which 
was granted by the Court of Ap-
peals of Maryland. 
The major issue before the 
court of appeals was whether Md. 
Code Art. 27, section 792 (1996 
& Supp. 2000) is a punitive statute 
that imposes a sanction triggering a 
right to a jury trial and the right to 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt 
under Apprendi. Young, 370 Md. 
at 693, 806 A.2d at 237. 
Accordingly, the court began its 
analysis by reviewing the Supreme 
Court's landmark Apprendi de-
cision. Id. at 695, 806 A.2d at 238. 
In Apprendi, the Supreme 
Court held "[0 ]ther than the fact of 
a prior conviction, any fact that 
increases the penalty for a crime 
beyond the prescribed statutory 
maximum must be submitted to a 
jury, and proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt." Id. at 696, 806 
A.2d at 239. Thus, the court 
stressed in order for Young's 
challenge to succeed, he must 
demonstrate the following indepen-
dent elements: (1) the sex offender 
registry constitutes punishment; (2) 
factual findings in question expose 
Young to a greater penalty than the 
prescribed statutory minimum; and 
(3) "that such factual prerequisites 
invo lve facts' other than the fact of 
a prior conviction. '" Id. at 696-97, 
806 A.2d at 239. 
The court had not previously 
considered any case that addressed 
whether the sex offender regis-
tration statute violates due process 
in light of Apprendi. Id. at 697, 
806 A.2d at 239. Accordingly, the 
court turned to both state and 
federal case law from other 
jurisdictions. Id. Other jurisdic-
tions dealt with whether registration 
and notification provisions of sex 
offender registration statutes or civil 
and forfeiture provisions constitute 
punishment for ex post facto, 
double jeopardy, and cruel and 
unusual punishment purposes. 
Young, 370 Md. at 697, 806 A.2d 
at 239. The court concluded the 
"overwhelming body of judicial 
precedent" demonstrates that sex 
offender registration is not 
punishment. Id. 
The common thread under-
lying the case precedent was the 
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application ofthe Usery-Hendricks 
"intent-effects test." Id. at 702-07, 
806 A.2d 242-46. In determining 
whether registration under Section 
792 constitutes punishment, the 
court applied the following two-part 
test: (1) whether the Legislature 
intended the sanction as punitive; 
and (2) whether there is "clearest 
proof' the statute is "so punitive" in 
effect as to prevent the court from 
legitimately viewing it as regulatory 
or civil in nature, despite the 
Legislature's intent. Id. at 702-03, 
806 A.2d at 242. 
To decipher the Legislature's 
intent, the court examined the 
legislation's declared purpose and 
the statute's text and structure. Id. 
at 711-12, 806 A.2d at 248. The 
court noted Section 792 contained 
no express statement of purpose. 
Id. at 712, 806 A.2d at 248. 
However, the court found the "plain 
language" and design of the statute 
"clearly indicated that it was not 
intended as punishment" but as a 
regulatory requirement intended to 
protect the public. Young, 370 Md. 
at 712,806 A.2d at 248. 
The court's next step 
determined whether, despite the 
Legislature's intent, Section 792 was 
"so punitive" in effect to prevent the 
court from legitimately viewing it as 
remedial in nature. Id. at 712-13, 
806 A.2d at 249. The court applied 
the following Mendoza-Martinez 
factors: (1) whether the sanction 
involves an affirmative disability or 
restraint; (2) whether it has his-
torically been regarded as a pun-
ishment; (3) whether it comes into 
play only on a finding of scienter; 
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(4) whether its operation will 
promote the traditional aims of 
punishment -- retribution and de-
terrence; (5) whether the behavior 
to which it applies is already a 
crime; (6) whether it lacks an 
alternative purpose to which it 
rationally may be connected; and 
(7) if such alternative does exist, 
whether the statute appears 
excessive in relation to it. Id at 698, 
806 A.2d at 240. 
Applying the Mendoza-Mart-
inez factors, the court concluded 
the effect of Section 792 was not 
"so punitive" as to outweigh the 
Legislature's remedial purpose. Id. 
at 714, 806 A.2d at 50. It noted 
the statute's physical restraints are 
minimal, emphasizing the affected 
person's movements are not re-
stricted in any way and the infor-
mation required to register does not 
impose an unreasonable burden. 
Id. at 713, 806 A.2d at 249. In 
addition, the court stated while the 
stigma associated with registration 
is an affirmative disability, "the 
burden is not so unreasonable, in 
light ofthe statute's remedial aims, 
that it converts the statute to a 
punitive one." Id. Furthermore, it 
found sex offender registration was 
not traditionally regarded as 
punishment and the statute 
contained no scienter requirement. 
Young, 370 Md. at 714-15, 806 
A.2d at 250. 
The court acknowledged that 
registration requirements further the 
aim of deterrence. Id. at 715,806 
A.2d at 250. Nevertheless, the 
court found the statute had legi-
timate purposes other than punish-
ment, including protecting the public, 
and alerting law enforcement and 
surrounding community to sexual 
offenders who may reoffend. Id. 
The court also asserted the statute 
was narrowly tailored to protect the 
public from sex offenders. Id. 
Finally, the court dealt squarely 
with whether the factual findings 
required under Section 792 
exposed the defendant to a greater 
penalty than the prescribed 
statutory maximum. Id. at 716, 806 
A.2d at 251. In holding that it did 
not, the court stated the fact 
McGregor was under the age of 
eighteen is not "a fact that increases 
[the sentence]." Id. In fact, the trial 
court sentenced Young to ten years, 
the statutory maximum, but sus-
pended two years and ordered 
Young to register as a sex offender 
as a condition of probation. Young, 
370 Md. at 716,806 A.2d at 251. 
Thus, the court stated "Apprendi 
does not apply to a case in which a 
trial court imposes a discretionary 
sentence within the permissible 
statutory range." Id. 
The Court of Appeals of Mary-
land, as a matter of first impression, 
held the Supreme Court's holding in 
Apprendi v. New Jersey does not 
apply to sex offender registration. 
In so holding, the court settled the 
issue of sex offender registration in 
light of Apprendi 's criminal due 
process implications in Maryland. 
However, Maryland practitioners 
should be aware, the court remained 
silent on new internet notification 
requirements and their Fourteenth 
Amendment due process impli-
cations. 
